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McCORMICK v UNITED STATES: THE QUID PRO
QUO REQUIREMENT IN HOBBS ACT
EXTORTION UNDER COLOR OF
OFFICIAL RIGHT
Extortion is one of the oldest crimes in Anglo-American jurisprudence.'
While the common law offense applied exclusively to public officials,2 contem-
porary extortion statutes often cover both private citizens and public officials.3
1. See EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 148-50 (London, Brooke 1797) (1648) (providing examples of extortion convictions in
England under early common law); see also Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1895
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to extortion as one of the oldest crimes in Anglo-
American jurisprudence).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.) (noting that
"common law ... extortion ... could only be committed by a public official"), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 914 (1972); see also People v. Barondess, 16 N.Y.S. 436, 438 (App. Div. 1891)
(discussing expansion of common law extortion under New York Penal Law of 1865), rev'd on
other grounds, 31 N.E. 240 (N.Y. 1892). But see James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction
Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV.
815, 837-89 (1988) (arguing that ordinary citizens could commit extortion at common law).
3. The following state and federal extortion statutes apply to both private citizens and
public officials: Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1804
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-102 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (Deering 1983);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-207 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-119(5) (West 1985);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 846 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3851 (1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-16 (Michie 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-764 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-2403
(1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 711.4 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3701 (1988); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 355 (West 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 25 (West 1990); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-513 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:5 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-5
(West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-9 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05(e)
(McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.3 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1481
(West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.075 (1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3923 (1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-30A-4 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-406 (1990).
The following state exteortion statutes apply only to public officials for misuse of public
office: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-13 to 13A-8-15 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.11 (West Supp.
1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:136 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 562C (1992);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.214 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-104 (1991);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.170 (Michie 1992); R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-42-2 (1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-204, 2-19-205 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3909 (West Supp.
1993); VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-470 (Michie 1988).
The following state statutes do not recognize the abuse of public office as a basis for
extortion: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:66 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 562B (1992);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.213 (West 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.320 (Michie
1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.11 (Anderson 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-640
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Currently, the Hobbs Act 4 arms United States Attorneys and prosecutors in
the Department of Justice's Public Integrity Section with a particularly ef-
fective weapon against state and local officials who engage in extortionate
activity.5 While Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in 1946 primarily to
curtail rising labor racketeering activities,6 the modern application of the
(Law Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-112 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1701
(Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-59 (Michie 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.1 10
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-13 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.30 (West 1982); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-2-402 (1977).
The following states have no extortion statute on their law books: Alaska; Illinois; Indiana;
Minnesota; Missouri; North Dakota.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). In relevant part, the Hobbs Act states: "Whoever in any
way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce ... by robbery or extortion ... in viola-
tion of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both." Id. § 1951(a).
5. See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The [Hobbs] Act
is a powerful and effective law enforcement tool .... It has become a principal weapon in the
government's arsenal against corruption in public affairs."). See generally Charles F.C. Ruff,
Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement
Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977) (detailing the manner in which the Hobbs Act has been used
to fight state and local corruption).
6. Congress initially proscribed extortion in the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569,
48 Stat. 979 (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988)). In relevant part, the 1934
Act stated:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any
degree affecting trade or commerce or any article of commodity moving or about to
move in trade or commerce-
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use
force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations,
or the purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however,
the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
force or fear, or under color of official right; ...
(d) ... shall ... be guilty of a felony ....
48 Stat. at 979-80.
The Supreme Court, however, instigated congressional passage of the Hobbs Act as a result
of its decision in United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942)
(Local 807). In Local 807, labor union members were violently forcing owners and drivers of
trucks to pay money for each truck entering New York City. Id. at 526. In some cases, the
union members offered to unload the trucks, but required an additional fee whether or not the
services were actually performed. Id. Applying the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act, the Supreme
Court construed the phrase "not including, however, the payment of wages by a bona fide
employer to a bona fide employee" in a manner which removed the Teamsters union activity
from the scope of the Act. Id. at 534-39. The subsequent congressional debate on passage of
the Hobbs Act revealed that the primary purpose "of the bill was to shut off the possibility
opened up by the Local 807 case, that union members could use their protected status to exact
payments from employers for imposed, unwanted, and superfluous services." United States v.
Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 403 (1973). The following statement, offered by United States Con-
gressman Hancock from the floor of the House of Representatives during congressional debate
on the bill, supports the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Hobbs Act in Enmons:
[Vol. 42:433
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Hobbs Act to public officials did not become prevalent until the early
1970s. 7
The Hobbs Act prohibits two types of extortion: coercive extortion and
extortion "under color of official right."8 Federal courts, prior to 1972,
refused to recognize the prosecution of public officials for extortion under
color of official right unless the prosecutor made a contemporaneous show-
ing of duress or coercion. 9 As a result, prosecutors relied exclusively on
coercive extortions for indictments brought under the Hobbs Act.' 0 In
1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit accepted the
government's argument that the office of a public official is inherently coer-
cive and adopted a disjunctive reading of the statute.1 The remaining
This bill is designed simply to prevent both union members and nonunion people
from making use of robbery and extortion under the guise of obtaining wages in the
obstruction of interstate commerce.... [It] is made necessary by the amazing deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in the case of the United States against Teamsters' Union
807, 3 years ago. That decision ... legalizes in certain labor disputes the use of
robbery and extortion.
91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock).
7. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
8. Specifically, the Hobbs Act defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 195 l(b)(2) (1988). Neither the language of
the statute nor the legislative debate on passage of the bill explicitly defines the phrase "under
color of official right." The legislative debate, however, does contain references to the common
law and to the New York Penal Code for guidance in defining this phrase. Thus, federal
courts have placed significant emphasis on common law and New York state law for interpre-
tation of the "under color of official right" phrase in the Hobbs Act. See infro notes 62-108
and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that
where members of the Alabama Attorney General's office were convicted of extortion, extor-
tion meant threatening to take official action for purposes of coercion), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1058 (1972); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 193 (8th Cir.) (commenting that unlawful
payments, made without force, violence, or fear, constituted bribery, not extortion), cert. de-
nied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638, 641-42 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
(holding that coercion was a necessary element of extortion under color of official right, and
that the mayor did not coerce the payor to provide kickbacks).
10. See McCormick v. United States, Ill S. Ct. 1807, 1813 n.5 (1991) (noting that prior
to the early 1970s, prosecutions of public officials for extortion required a showing of force or
fear, rather than an independent showing of abuse of public office). The Court specifically
observed that: "Until the early 1970s, extortion prosecutions under the Hobbs Act rested on
allegations that the consent of the transferor of property had been 'induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear-'; public officials had not been prosecuted under
the 'color of official right' phrase standing alone." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (1988)).
11. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
The Third Circuit ruled that a public official need not use force, violence, or fear to be con-
victed of Hobbs Act extortion "under color of official right." Id. A strict textual reading of
the Hobbs Act leads to this conclusion since "extortion" is defined as "the obtaining of prop-
erty from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis
added).
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United States Courts of Appeals ultimately followed the Third Circuit's lead
and permitted the prosecution of public officials who illegally obtain prop-
erty "under color of official right" without requiring an independent show-
ing of "violence, force, or fear" on the part of the public official.' 2
The federal courts subsequently wrestled with different aspects of the
phrase "under color of official right," settling on the scope and meaning of
such elements as intent, public official, and the extortionate transaction.1
3
Most recently, two questions have divided the federal circuits regarding
Hobbs Act extortion by public officials. The first issue concerns whether a
public official's passive acceptance of an unsolicited bribe is sufficient to
prove extortion, or whether an affirmative act of inducement by the official is
required.' 4 The second question involves the evidentiary threshold neces-
sary to convict an elected public official for extortion based on the official's
12. See, e.g., United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1559 (1lth Cir. 1986); United
States v. McClelland, 731 F.2d 1438, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1010
(1985); United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1062 (1978); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
819 (1976); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall,
536 F.2d 313, 320-21 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Trotta,
525 F.2d 1096, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v.
Price, 507 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875, 877-78
(7th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 517 F.2d 53 (1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 837 (1976).
13. A public official need not intend to affect interstate commerce to be guilty of extortion.
Rather, any extortion which affects interstate commerce will suffice. See, e.g., United States v.
Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that any extortion affecting interstate
commerce is a violation of the Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); United States v.
Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 77 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that the Hobbs Act does not require an
intention to affect interstate commerce, but only that the extortion did affect interstate com-
merce), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972). Furthermore, a public official need not possess the
actual authority so claimed to be convicted of extortion. Rather, a victim's reasonable but
mistaken belief that the extortionist possessed the authority would satisfy the essential ele-
ments of Hobbs Act extortion. See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3d Cir.)
(stating that if the victim of the extortion reasonably believed that the defendant had the power
to grant leases, the defendant's lack of such power did not preclude his guilt), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Salvitti, 464 F. Supp. 611, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (stating that
actual power is not necessary to prove extortion). Finally, an extortionate transaction is not
dependant upon the extortionist's gain; instead, the victim's loss alone may establish the ille-
gality of the transaction. See, e.g., Hyde, 448 F.2d at 843; United States v. Provenzano, 334
F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
14. Compare United States v. Swift, 732 F.2d 878, 880 (11th Cir. 1984) (indicating that
inducement by the public official is not required), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985) and Mc-
Clelland, 731 F.2d at 1439-40 (same) and 673 F.2d 578, 594-96 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (same),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) and United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980) and United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033 (7th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) with United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158,
1162-69 (9th Cir. 1988) (departing from its previous position in McClelland and following the
O'Grady holding) and United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 688-91 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
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illegal solicitation of campaign contributions.'" Specifically, the second issue
centers on whether an explicit quid pro quo, which is defined as a payment
made in return for an explicit promise by the public official to perform or not
to perform an official act,16 should be required to show a violation of the
Hobbs Act.'7 The majority of federal circuits have required the government
to show a quid pro quo in order to prove extortion under color of official
right for the illegal solicitation or receipt of campaign monies.' 8 On the
other hand, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and the
Second Circuits have treated evidence of a quid pro quo as support for an
extortion charge, rather than as an essential element of the crime. 9 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in McCormick v. United States20 to re-
solve the conflict in circuit court decisions.
The petitioner in McCormick, a member of the West Virginia House
of Delegates,2 ' represented an economically depressed coal mining region
that an affirmative act of inducement by an official was required for a Hobbs Act prosecution
under color of official right). See infra note 43.
15. See infra notes 111-64 and accompanying text. This issue emanates from the need to
prevent Hobbs Act prosecutions of lawful solicitations of campaign contributions. The solici-
tation of political funds is avoidable in election campaigns financed by private contributions
and expenditures.
16. See McCormick v. United States, Ill S. Ct. 1807, 1816 (1991). Another definition for
"quid pro quo" is "[wihat for what; something for something. Used in law for the giving of
one valuable thing for another. It is nothing more than the mutual consideration which passes
between the parties to a contract, and which renders it valid and binding." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990). An additional source defines "quid pro quo" as
"[s]omething for something; giving one valuable thing for another (membership on the com-
mittee was the quid pro quo for the contribution). Consideration, reciprocity, barter, in-
terchange, trading; retaliation. See also exchange .... offset .. " WILLIAM P. STATSKY,
WEST'S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICrIONARY 625-26 (1986). Synonyms for "quid pro quo" in-
clude "agreement, counterbalance, counterpoise, equipoise, exchange, express agreement, give
and take, interchange, measure for measure, mutual agreement, mutual consideration, mutual
understanding, one thing in return for another, reciprocality, reciprocation, reciprocity, some-
thing equivalent, something for something, substitute, understanding." WILLIAM C. BURTON,
LEGAL THESAURUS 425 (1980). Professor Corbin explained that "[a] quid pro quo is the an-
tithesis of something for nothing. It expresses the idea of a bargain-an exchange of this for
that." ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 117 (1952).
17. Compare, e.g., United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1990) (follow-
ing the Trotta holding), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991) and United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d
1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that a specific quid pro quo is not necessary to prove
extortion by a public official under the Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) with
United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1985) (arguing that an explicit quid
pro quo is required), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986) and United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d
531, 537 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
18. See infra notes 119-40 and accompanying text.
19. See McCormick, 896 F.2d at 66; Trotta, 525 F.2d at 1100.
20. 498 U.S. 807 (1990).
21. See McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807, 1809 (1991).
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which suffered from a shortage of medical personnel.22 Consequently, Dele-
gate McCormick was a leading advocate of a legislative program that al-
lowed foreign medical school graduates to practice under temporary permits
while studying for the West Virginia state licensing exams.23 Under the pro-
gram, a number of doctors practiced for years while repeatedly failing the
exams." 4 In 1984, McCormick sponsored a bill that extended the program's
expiration date and, in the 1985 session, he agreed to sponsor legislation that
would grant some of the doctors a permanent license as a result of their
years of experience.25 Coalfield Health Care Association, a group organized
by the foreign doctors, actively supported the legislation.26
During his 1984 drive for reelection, McCormick informed the foreign
doctors' lobbyist that the campaign was expensive.27 McCormick empha-
sized that he had already spent a significant amount of his own money on his
campaign, and indicated that the foreign doctors had not yet contributed. 28
Soon thereafter, McCormick received from the doctors four cash payments
which he did not list as campaign contributions or report as income on his
1984 federal income tax return.29 Following the passage of the permanent
22. See Brief of Petitioner at 7-8, McCormick v. United States, 896 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.
1990) (No. 89-1918). In 1985, there were 21.4 licensed, practicing doctors for every 10,000
persons in the United States. Id. at 7. During the same period, the physician-to-population
ratio in the state of West Virginia as a whole amounted to approximately 14.2 physicians for
every 10,000 persons. Id. at 8. In McCormick's political district, there were 7.4 physicians for
every 10,0000 persons. Id.
23. Id. Logan General Hospital, the largest in McCormick's district, relied almost en-
tirely on temporarily licensed, foreign physicians. Id. By 1983, several key physicians on
Logan General's staff had not been able to pass the state licensing exam, and were facing the
revocation of their temporary licenses in June of 1984. Id. Hospital administrators projected
that if these temporary permit holders were forced to end their practice, the hospital's emer-
gency room would have to be closed immediately. Id. The closest emergency services in the
area would then be found in Charleston, located two and one-half hours away from Logan
General by car. Id.
24. See McCormick, I llS. Ct. at 1809.
.25. Id. at 1810.
26. Id. Coalfield Health Care Association hired a lobbyist, John Vandergrift, to represent
the foreign doctors in the state capital. Id. Furthermore, representatives from the organiza-
tion helped draft legislation and met with other members of the West Virginia state legislature.
See United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1807
(1991).
27. See McCormick, III S. Ct. at 1810.
28. Id. McCormick told Vandergrift, the doctors' lobbyist, "that he had not heard any-
thing from the foreign doctors." Id.
29. Id. On June 1, 1984, Vandergrift delivered an envelope to McCormick which con-
tained nine hundred dollars in cash. Id. This payment provided the basis for the jury's sole
extortion conviction. Id. at 1812. Subsequently, McCormick received a payment of two thou-
sand dollars, which was delivered by his grandnephew, and additional payments of eight hun-
dred dollars on November 1, 1984, and six hundred dollars on December 19, 1984, both of
which Dr. Ernesto Manuel, a spokesman for the foreign physicians, delivered personally. Id.
at 1810; see also McCormick, 896 F.2d at 63-64.
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medical licensing legislation in 1985, the doctors sent another cash payment
to McCormick.3° Again, McCormick failed either to list the money as a
campaign contribution or report the money to the Internal Revenue Service
as income.3' Subsequently, a grand jury indicted McCormick in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia 32 on five
counts of violating the Hobbs Act by extorting payments under color of offi-
cial right,33 and one count of filing a false income tax return in violation of
§ 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code.3 4
At the end of McCormick's trial, the judge instructed the petit jury that
extortion under color of official right does not occur when a "public official
receives a . . . voluntary political contribution ' 3' and that "[v]oluntary is
that which is freely given without expectation of benefit.", 36 The jury
convicted McCormick on one extortion count, but failed to reach verdicts on
the remaining four.37 The district court declared a mistrial on those four
counts.3 8
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit up-
held the conviction for Hobbs Act extortion. Recognizing that the volun-
tary receipt of campaign contributions by elected representatives fell outside
the ambit of the Hobbs Act, the appellate court enunciated a seven-point
test 39 to determine whether the funds received by McCormick were intended
30. See Brief for the United States at 6, McCormick v. United States, 896 F.2d 61 (4th
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-1918). McCormick received nine hundred fifty dollars from Dr. Manuel on
May 15, 1985, two weeks after the permanent licensing legislation became law. Id.
31. See McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1810.
32. Id.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1988). Campaign contributions were not considered taxable in-
come under I.R.C. § 24 (1985). Thus, a jury determination that the payments in McCormick
were campaign contributions would result in the defendant's acquittal on the charge of filing a
false income tax return. Because the Supreme Court in McCormick ruled that even legitimate
campaign contributions could form the basis of an extortion conviction, McCormick's convic-
tion for extortion would not necessarily demonstrate that the payments were not campaign
contributions and hence taxable. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court indicated that the court of
appeals on remand might affirm McCormick's tax conviction on grounds independent of the
extortion charge. See McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1817-18.
35. McCormick, III S. Ct. at 1817-18. The trial judge offered the instruction on volunta-
riness only after the jury requested to hear the instructions again with an emphasis on the
definition of extortion. Id.
36. Id. at 1812. The trial court also noted that "[it would not be illegal, in and of itself,
for Mr. McCormick to solicit or accept political contributions from foreign doctors who would
benefit from this legislation." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See infra note 162.
1993]
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to be campaign contributions.' In dicta, the majority rejected the blanket
requirement that the prosecution must demonstrate an explicit quid pro quo
to convict a public official of extortion under the Hobbs Act.4
In McCormick v. United States,42 the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that the government was required to show a quid pro quo;
in other words, the government must prove that the public official performed
or did not perform an official duty in return for the payment of campaign
funds.43 Thus, campaign contributions are extorted by an elected public offi-
cial in violation of the Hobbs Act only when the official explicitly asserts
that the receipt of such funds will control his official conduct. '
The Supreme Court's decision focused primarily on the Fourth Circuit's
"legitimacy test" and on the breadth of the district court's jury instruc-
40. See United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 67 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
1807 (1991). The court of appeals judged that "the evidence supports the conclusion that the
money was never intended by any of the parties to be a campaign contribution." Id.
41. Id. at 66. The appellate court noted its "agree[ment] with the Second Circuit['s hold-
ing in Trotta] that alleged 'political contributions' may violate the Hobbs Act in more than one
way." Id.
42. 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991).
43. See id. at 1813 n.5. The Court did not resolve the question of inducement in McCor-
mick, although the majority explicitly noted the split among the United States Courts of Ap-
peals and implied that the issue would be addressed in the future. Id. In May 1992, the
Supreme Court ruled that an affirmative act of inducement is not required under the Hobbs
Act to prove extortion under color of official right. See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881
(1992). Before the Evans decision, a majority of the United States Courts of Appeals reasoned
that the power inherent in public office supplied the necessary pressure or threat, and therefore
public officials did not need to induce or make prior requests for the payments. See, e.g.,
United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 134 (7th Cir.) (explaining that public officials' use
of office to obtain money is the crux of "under color of official right"), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1020 (1985); United States v. Martin, 751 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1984) (indicating that status of
public official supplies potential threat). In such instances, the passive receipt of an unsolicited
bribe amounted to extortion under color of official right. See also United States v. Evans, 910
F.2d 790, 796-97 (1 1th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992); United States v. Paschall, 772
F.2d 68, 73 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 (1986); United States v. Jannotti, 673
F.2d 578, 595 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Butler,
618 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d
123, 124 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d
1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
On the other hand, both the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit required the government
to prove an affirmative act of inducement by the public official in order to convict for extortion
under color of official right. See United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 1988)
("[P]roof that the defendant 'induced' the improper payment is an essential element in the
crime of extortion. ... ); United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 1984)
("[E]xtortion under color of official right [does not] occur[ ] when a public official merely
accepts unsolicited benefits knowing that they were given because of his public office."). The
Supreme Court's decision in Evans forced the Ninth and the Second Circuits to abandon the
minority rule requiring proof of an affirmative act of inducement.
44. See McCormick, I llS. Ct. at 1816.
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tions.45 To protect against the disruption of legitimate fundraising activities,
the majority ruled that a specific quid pro quo, rather than the general ex-
pectation of a benefit, was necessary to qualify as a Hobbs Act violation
where the defendant claimed that the money was a campaign contribution."
The dissent acknowledged that legitimate political contributions fall
outside the scope of the Hobbs Act,47 but would not require proof of an
explicit quid pro quo to convict an elected public official of Hobbs Act extor-
tion.48 Accordingly, a public official's implicit promise to perform or not to
perform particular activities in exchange for the victim's money would suf-
fice to show a violation of the Hobbs Act.49 The dissent maintained that the
crime of extortion is committed if the victim knows that the official's support
of specific legislation is contingent upon the payment,50 although the act of
soliciting campaign contributions from donors who stand to benefit generally
from the candidate's election is not illegitimate.5
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he closely examined
the phrase "under color of official right" in the Hobbs Act.52 Reluctantly
adopting the majority's holding, Justice Scalia noted that the statute makes
no reference to quid pro quos or campaign contributions, 3 but argued that
the nature of the American political system required such a limitation on
Hobbs Act prosecutions.54 Nonetheless, the absence of any statutory lan-
guage in support of a quid pro quo requirement disturbed him.55 Posing an
alternative interpretation, Justice Scalia suggested that extortion under color
of official right might be limited to property received under false pretense of
45. See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
46. See McCormick, 11l S. Ct. at 1816. Justice White indicated that:
[t]he receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable under the Act as having been
taken under color of official right, but only if the payments are made in return for an
explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official
act. In such situations the official asserts that his official conduct will be controlled
by the terms of the promise or undertaking.
Id.
47. Id. at 1820-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1821.
49. Id. Justice Stevens reasoned in the dissenting opinion that "[n]either the legislator nor
the thug needs to make an explicit threat or an explicit promise to get his message across." Id.
50. Id. at 1824.
51. Id. Justice Stevens noted that "[a] candidate's solicitation of. . . contributions from
donors who would benefit from his or her election is perfectly legitimate." Id.
52. Id. at 1818-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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official entitlement. 6 This perspective, however, was left for consideration
in the context of future cases."
This Note examines the issue of a quid pro quo requirement in the context
of extortion under color of official right. After a brief examination of extor-
tion at common law, this Note reviews the statutory and judicial history of
the New York extortion law upon which the Hobbs Act was modeled. It
then examines the conflicting federal court decisions on the issue of quid pro
quo and analyzes the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of McCor-
mick v. United States. This Note concludes that the quid pro quo require-
ment is an appropriate and necessary qualification in the prosecution of
elected public officials for extortion of campaign contributions, but that the
threshold of proof for extortion under color of official right in other contexts
should not be as strict.
I. EXTORTION UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Since Congress adopted the Hobbs Act in 1946,5" the federal courts have
expanded the crime of extortion under color of official right from its initial
narrow application to public officials who demanded or received a fee to
which they were not entitled, or who extorted money by force or coercion,
into a broad license for policing corruption in local and state political
processes.59 The federal courts have frequently drawn support for their de-
cisions on official right extortion from common law' and from the New
York Penal Code with its associated case law.61
A. Common Law Extortion
Extortion at common law consisted of an official's illegal receipt of money
as payment for his official duties.62 In particular, the crime was committed
56. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
57. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 6.
59. See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1984). The majority in
O'Grady observed that the crime of extortion has expanded "from a narrow prohibition aimed
at public officials who demand or receive a fee not due them or their office, or who extort
money by force or violence, into a broad license for 'federal authorities to police influence
peddling in the political processes of the states.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Mazzei, 521
F.2d 639, 652 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975)).
60. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947) (stating "[a]t
common law, if a public employee under color of his office demanded and received money or a
thing of value to which he is not entitled, he was guilty of extortion") (citations omitted); State
v. Goodman, 89 A.2d 243, 250 (N.J. 1952) (discussing extortion at common law as the illegal
taking of money by a public officer "under color of office"); State v. Burton, 3 Ind. 95 (1851)
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when an officer collected unwarranted fees,13 or received more money than
he was entitled to collect' or before he was entitled to collect.65 The com-
mon law crime contained no requirement of force, violence, or fear. 66 In-
stead, the taking of money "by color of his office" required only that the
officer knowingly received money to which he was not entitled for the per-
formance of his official duties.67 The official's plan to collect fees to which
he was not legally entitled constituted the corrupt intent, which was the es-
sence of the offense at common law. 68 The officer must have acted in his
official capacity, 69 and he must have intentionally sought and received the
(holding that the circuit court erred in quashing the indictment for extortion of an officer for
taking fees for services not performed); State v. Stotts, 5 Blackf. 460, 461-62 (Ind. 1840)
(same); Commonwealth v. Bagley, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 279, 281 (1828) (same); People v. Wha-
ley, 6 Cow. 661, 663-64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (same); see also COKE, supra note 1, at 149
(discussing early English common law extortion cases). See generally Lindgren, supra note 2,
at 837-89 (providing a detailed account of extortion at common law).
63. See, e.g., State v. Weleck, 91 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1952); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 69
A.2d 428 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949).
64. See, e.g., Loftus v. State, 19 A. 183 (N.J. 1890).
65. William Blackstone authored the following definition of extortion at common law:
"[A]ny officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money or thing of
value, that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due." 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES '141. "[Iln the common law, the term 'extortion'... designates a
crime committed by an officer of the law who, under cover or color of his office, unlawfully
and corruptly takes any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or
before it is due." 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1 (1960); see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Extortion, Blackmail,
and Threats § 2 (1939). See generally Alice K. Griep, Comment, Criminal Law-A Study of
Statutory Blackmail and Extortion in the Several States, 44 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1945).
66. See Sutter, 160 F.2d at 756 (recognizing that common law extortion was character-
ized by misuse of public office rather than by force, threats, or pressure).
67. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 595 (3d Cir.) (noting that the common
law definition of extortion was met where defendant city officials accepted money that was not
due them or their office for the performance of official duties), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting that the common
law definition of extortion was met where the public official took a fee to which he was not
entitled "for the performance or nonperformance of an official function"), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1116 (1979).
68. See Cleaveland v. State, 34 Ala. 254, 258-59 (1859); Hood v. State, 245 S.W. 176, 176
(Ark. 1922); LaTour v. Stone, 190 So. 704, 709-10 (Fla. 1939); Lincoln v. Shaw, 17 Mass. 410,
411 (1821); State v. Gardner, 2 Mo. 23, 23 (1828); People v. Clark, 151 N.E. 631, 634-35 (N.Y.
1926); State v. Bums, 1 P.2d 229, 229 (Wash. 1931) (Beals, J., concurring); see also 35 C.J.S.
Extortion § 3 (1960) (noting that "[a]t common law ... in order to constitute extortion, the act
must have been done with a corrupt intent .... The corrupt intent lies in the design on the
part of the officer to collect fees to which he is not legally entitled").
69. See, e.g., United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1228-29 (3d Cir.) (noting that "com-
mon law... extortion ... could only be committed by a public official"), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
914 (1972); Collier v. State, 55 Ala. 125, 128 (1876); see also Griep, supra note 65, at 461
(asserting that private citizens could not commit extortion at common law). But see Lindgren,
supra note 2, at 837-89 (arguing that ordinary citizens could commit extortion at common
law).
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money.7" Therefore, if a payor voluntarily gave money to a public official,
that official could not be charged with the crime of extortion by color of
office. 7
The common law crime of extortion evolved over the years into state stat-
utory offenses, many of which retained the character of the common law
offense. New York state extortion law provides important historical gui-
dance for an analysis of the Hobbs Act since the drafters of the federal law
relied heavily on the language of the New York statute.
B. Extortion Under New York Penal Law
According to the congressional debates that preceded passage of the
Hobbs Act, the term "under color of official right" emanated from the New
York Penal Law of 1909.72 Section 850 of the New York Penal Law defined
the crime of extortion as the receipt of property from an individual, or the
receipt of corporate property from a director of the corporation, with the
consent of the provider, induced by the illegal use of violence or apprehen-
sion, or under color of official right.73
70. See, e.g., Cleaveland, 34 Ala. at 259; Dunlap v. Curtis, 10 Mass. 210, 211 (1813); see
also 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 6 (1960) (noting that in order "[t]o constitute extortion at common
law, there must be the receipt of money or some other thing of value"); Comment, United
States v. Mazzei: Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 62 VA. L. REV 439, 441
(1976) (indicating that common law extortion consisted of "corruptly demanding").
71. See, e.g., United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Aguon, 813 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The ordinary meaning of 'to extort' is 'to
obtain from an unwilling person.' This ordinary meaning was preserved by the interpretation
the [common law] courts gave to 'color of office.' "); Daniels v. United States, 17 F.2d 339, 342
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 744 (1927); La Tour, 190 So. at 709-710; see also 35 C J.S.
Extortion § 5 (1960) (noting that a voluntary payment to a public official does not constitute
extortion under color of office).
72. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) ("[T]here is nothing clearer than the definition
of robbery and extortion in this bill. They have been construed by the courts not once, but a
thousand times. The definitions in this bill are copied from the New York Code substan-
tially.") (statement of Rep. Hobbs); id. ("[The] definitions of robbery and extortion [in the
Hobbs Act] . . . follow the definitions contained in the laws of the State of New York.")
(statement of Rep. Hancock); id. at 11,848 (statement of Rep. Powell); id. at 11,904 (statement
of Rep. Gwynne); 89 CONG. REC. 3227 (1943) (statement of Rep. Hobbs); id. at 3205 (state-
ment of Rep. Graham); see also United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 653 (3d Cir.) ("There is
little doubt that the draftsmen of the 1934 Act took the term 'color of official right' from the
New York Penal Law of 1909."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Nedley,
255 F.2d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1958).
73. The New York Penal Law of 1909 specifically defined "extortion" as "the obtaining of
property from another, or obtaining the property of a corporation from an officer, agent or
employee thereof, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color
of official right." N.Y. Penal Law of 1909 § 850.
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The phrase "under color of official right" in the New York Code traced its
origin to the Field Code.7 4 The Field Code defined extortion as "the ob-
taining of property from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful
use of force or fear, or under color of official right."" An official comment
by the drafters of the Field Code to the section on extortion referred to an
early New York case, People v. Whaley,7 6 for clarification of extortion under
color of official right.7 7
In the Whaley case, the New York Supreme Court adopted a narrow con-
ception of extortion under color of office.7" After dismissing for lack of ju-
risdiction a lawsuit to collect money owed on a financial note against the
defendant Butler,79 Justice of the Peace Whaley secretly collected the money
at a private meeting with Butler.80 A jury found Justice Whaley guilty of
extortion since he had no jurisdiction after dismissing the suit to enter a legal
judgment and collect money from Butler.8"
74. COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, THE PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(1865) [hereinafter FIELD CODE]. The New York State Constitution of 1846 directed that the
next state legislature appoint three commissioners "to revise, reform, simplify, and abridge the
rules and practice, forms and proceedings of the courts of record." See FRANCIS X.
CARMODY, CARMODY-FORKOSCH NEW YORK PRACTICE § 9 (8th ed. 1963) (quoting N.Y.
CONST. OF 1846, art. VI § 24). As a result, the commissioners were appointed in 1847 to carry
this constitutional provision into effect. David Dudley Field, the principal commissioner,
oversaw the reporting of the "Code of Procedure" to the Legislatures of 1848 and 1849, which
promptly enacted the provisions into law. The Code is generally referred to as the FIELD
CODE in honor of David Field. See HERBERT PETERFREUND & JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
NEW YORK PRACTICE: CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS § 1 (3d ed. 1973).
75. FIELD CODE, supra note 74, § 613.
76. 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
77. See FIELD CODE, supra note 74, § 613 cmt.
78. See Whaley, 6 Cow. at 663. The court indicated that "[e]xtortion signifies, in an en-
larged sense, any oppression under color of right. In a stricter sense, it signifies the taking of
money by any officer, by color of his office; either, where none at all is due, or not so much due,
or when it is not yet due." Id.
79. Id. at 662. The case was dismissed by the Justice of the Peace because the plaintiff did
not appear in court to press his claim against Butler. Id. at 661. In fact, Justice Whaley
indicated his intent to charge the plaintiff with court costs as a result of his non-appearance.
Id.
80. Id. at 662. During this meeting, Butler confessed his guilt, Justice Whaley entered a
judgment against Butler, and Whaley collected the amount owed on the note, as well as the
costs of previous summonses and fees of the constable and witnesses. Id.
81. Id. at 664. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reviewing the trial
court's jury instructions, stated that:
The court charged the jury, that if they believed that [the plaintiff] Grant was non-
suited by the justice, or that the cause was discontinued before him, the subsequent
proceedings were.., void for want of jurisdiction; and the receipt of any money from
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On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, indicated
that the controlling question with regard to extortion under color of office
was whether Justice Whaley took the fee knowing that he was not entitled to
the money.8 2 Thus, a mistaken belief by Justice Whaley that he was entitled
to the money would not support a conviction for extortion under color of
office. Rather, a corrupt taking was necessary.8 3 Since questions of intent
are typically decided by the trier of fact, the extortion conviction was af-
firmed by the higher court 4 after the jury at the trial level had found Wha-
ley's intent to be corrupt.85
In addition to the allusion to Whaley, the Field Code referred to the offi-
cial comment which followed the section on larceny.86 The larceny com-
ment distinguished between robbery, which was defined as "a taking of
property from another against his consent, ' ,87 and extortion, which was also
defined as a taking, but one in which consent of the injured party was in-
duced by threats or under pretense of office.88 Consistent with this charac-
terization of extortion, the court in Whaley ruled that the Justice had
collected the money under false pretense of entitlement by means of his of-
fice.89 Thus, the application of narrow common law principles in Whaley,9 °
coupled with the distinction between robbery and extortion found in the
Field Code's official comment to the section on larceny, indicate that early
82. Id. The appellate court noted that "if [the jury] believed the defendant acted without
corrupt or dishonest motives, supposing that he had a right to proceed as he had done, it
would be their duty to acquit him." Id.
83. Id. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text for references to common law cases
on corrupt intent.
84. Whaley, 6 Cow. at 662. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, con-
cluded that "[t]he jury ... found ... that [Justice Whaley] received and demanded the money
by color of his office, and with the corrupt intent charged in the indictment. These facts being
proved, the offence was complete." Id. at 664.
85. Id. The court explained that "[t]he questions of fact and intent, were fairly submitted
to the jury. It was their province to judge of both." Id.
86. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 893 n.480 (citing FIELD CODE, supra note 74, § 613
cmt.). According to Professor Lindgren, this section of the FIELD CODE referred to the official
comment which followed § 584 on larceny. In relevant part, the official comment after § 584
stated:
In robbery... There is a taking of property from another against his consent ....
In extortion there is again a taking. Now it is with the consent of the party injured;
but this is a consent induced by threats, or under color of some official right ...
Thus extortion partakes in an inferior degree of the nature of robbery.
See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 893 n.480 (quoting FIELD CODE supra note 74, § 584 cmt.).
87. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 893 n.480 (quoting FIELD CODE, supra note 74, § 584
cmt.).
88. Id.
89. See People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661, 662-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
90. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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New York law on extortion under color of office merely covered cases in-
volving false claims of entitlement under pretense of office.9 '
In 1881, the New York Legislature adopted an amended version of the
Field Code, which included a section known as the Penal Code of 188 1.92
Subsequently, in 1892, the case of People v. Barondess93 presented the New
York Court of Appeals94 with its first opportunity to interpret the new ex-
tortion statute in the Penal Code.
In People v. Barondess, the New York Court of Appeals reinstated a labor
leader's extortion conviction," following the Supreme Court's initial rever-
sal of his conviction.96 The Court of Appeals held that the labor leader's
demand for money in exchange for the striking employees' return to work
was, in fact, illegal. 97 The alleged victim was a cloak manufacturing firm in
New York City named Popkin & Marks,9" whose employees had quit work
because of dissatisfaction with their wages. The employees subsequently
agreed to return to work, but did so on a day-to-day basis rather than under
contract. 99 One morning, however, the employees did not return as ex-
pected. Instead, Barondess approached the firm, accompanied by several
employees, and indicated that the employees would not return until the firm
paid him five hundred dollars. Ultimately, the firm gave Barondess one hun-
dred dollars, and the employees returned to work."°° Barondess was subse-
quently convicted for extortion.
On the initial appeal, the New York Supreme Court viewed Barondess'
actions not as the illegal receipt of a fee under color of office, but rather as an
explicit threat of economic harm in order to obtain money from the firm.' 0 '
91. See generally Lindgren, supra note 2, at 894-95.
92. See United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 654 (3d Cir.) (noting that the Field Code
"served as a prototype for a new penal statute, the Penal Code of 1881"), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1014 (1975).
93. 31 N.E. 240 (N.Y. 1892).
94. The New York Court of Appeals is the state's highest court. The New York Supreme
Court is the state's intermediate appellate court.
95. See Barondess, 31 N.E. at 241-42.
96. See People v. Barondess, 16 N.Y.S. 436, 437 (App. Div. 1891), rev'd, 31 N.E. 240
(N.Y. 1892). Referring to the threats made by Barondess, the New York Supreme Court
noted that "[i]n the case at bar the elements of violence, intimidation, and physical injury to
tangible property are entirely wanting. The threats made were not threats of violence ....
Was [there] a threat to do an unlawful injury to the complainants' property? The answer...
must be in the negative." Id.
97. See Barondess, 31 N.E. at 241-42.
98. Id. at 240.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 241.
101. See People v. Barondess, 16 N.Y.S. 436, 436 (App. Div. 1891), rev'd, 31 N.E. 240
(N.Y. 1892). The New York Supreme Court explained that "[t]he main question in this case is
whether the obtaining of money from another, with his consent, induced by a threat to injure
1993]
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The Supreme Court ruled that Barondess' demand for money was not ille-
gal,10 2 and reversed his conviction for extortion.
The Court of Appeals adopted a broader construction of "property,"
which included the "business" of Popkin & Marks.'0 3 As a result, the New
York Court of Appeals reinstated Barondess' conviction for extortion,
thereby reversing the Supreme Court.
Despite the high court's reversal of the intermediate appellate court's
holding in Barondess, the Supreme Court's discussion of common law extor-
tion doctrine was not disturbed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court recognized that the New York Penal Code expanded the scope of
common law extortion."° At common law, the court noted, an individual
who obtained money by the use of force or fear was guilty, not of extortion,
but of robbery."10 According to the court, the New York Penal Law
brought the common law crime of extortion and a form of robbery under
one heading because in both cases the payor consented to the payment of
money as a result of the extortionist's coercion; traditional robbery involved
no consent on the part of the victim.'0 6
the business of the individual threatened, by persuading his employe[e]s to absent themselves
from work, is 'extortion.'" Id.
102. Id. at 439. The Supreme Court in Barondess refused to treat the employees' labor as
property of the firm. Rather, the court reversed the conviction after holding that (1) the legal
rights of the employees included the right to withhold their labor for higher wages, (2) the
legal rights of Barondess included the right to represent the employees in a labor dispute, and
(3) Barondess' actions with respect to the firm involved no violence, intimidation, or interfer-
ence. See id. at 437-39. While analyzing the extortion statute, the court noted that an illegal
demand by Barondess or one that involved force or unwarranted intimidation against Popkin
& Marks would have amounted to extortion. Id. at 439.
The sections of the New York Penal Code cited by the Supreme Court in the Barondess case
include § 552 ("Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced
by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right."); § 553 ("Fear, such as will
constitute extortion, may be induced by a threat: 1. To do an unlawful injury to the person or
property of the individual threatened .... ); § 557 ("A public officer who asks, or receives, or
agrees to receive, a fee or other compensation for his official service, either[:] In excess of the
fee or compensation allowed to him by statute therefor; or Where no fee or compensation is
allowed to him by statute therefor; Commits extortion .... "). Id. at 436-38.
103. See Barondess, 31 N.E. at 241-42. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated that the
extortion statute in the New York Penal Code:
does not require the narrow construction insisted upon by the defendant's counsel,
for it has not been, either by its language or reasonable import, confined to the case of
an actual injury to some specific article or property, but it has been made to include
the threat to do any unlawful injury to property; and business is property, as much as
the articles themselves which are included in its transactions.
Id. at 241. Contra supra note 102.
104. See Barondess, 16 N.Y.S. at 438.
105. Id.; cf FIELD CODE, supra note 74, § 584 cmt. (distinguishing between extortion and
robbery based on the consent of the victim).
106. The New York Supreme Court noted in Barondess that:
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Significantly, a number of New York cases involving extortion from the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century presented facts which today
would clearly fall within the ambit of "official right" extortion under the
Hobbs Act. Most of these cases involved labor leaders who demanded
money from employers under threat of prolonged labor strikes or contrac-
tors who demanded illegal fees to commence contract work.' ° 7 The New
York courts, however, did not apply extortion under color of official right in
such situations. Rather, the courts employed a rule analogous to contempo-
rary coercive extortion in situations which involved the threat of violence or
illegal economic intimidation.1" 8 In the absence of force or violence, the
courts still imposed criminal liability for coercive extortion if reasonable fear
of future economic loss arose from the illegal threat of a labor strike or boy-
cott, as was the case in Barondess.
In 1946, Congress enacted the Hobbs Act, 1"9 a federal extortion statute
comparable to the New York law. Over the next twenty-five years, the fed-
eral courts expanded the scope of the Hobbs Act significantly. Once the
Third Circuit recognized extortion under color of official right as a crime
[t]he obtaining of money by force or fear does not... seem to have been extortion...
at common law . ... It was robbery, at common law, to extort money under the
threat of charging one with an unnatural crime ....
Section 552 of the [New York] Penal Code is in the alternative, treating extortion
by force and fear as one thing, and extortion by official action as another. These two
methods of extortion are separately defined in subsequent sections, but it is apparent
from the language of the section providing the penalty for extortion by force or fear
(section 554) that the latter is but a supplement, under the name of 'extortion,' to
robbery in the first, second, and third degrees. This section (554) provides for such
punishment only when the money or other property has been extorted by force or
fear 'under circumstances not amounting to robbery;' in other words, when the money
or other property has been obtained 'with the consent' of the complainant, and not
'against his will,' for really the main distinction between robbery in some degree and
this form of extortion lies just there.
Barondess, 16 N.Y.S. at 438 (emphasis added).
107. See. e.g., People v. Sheridan, 174 N.Y.S. 327, 329 (App. Div. 1919) (affirming the
conviction of an elevator inspector of extortion for threatening disclosure of faulty elevator
unless landlord made payments); People ex rel. Short v. Warden of City Prison, 130 N.Y.S.
698, 700-01 (App. Div. 1911) (affirming the guilty verdict of a prison warden for extortion
after the warden secured a position for a painter and then threatened discharge unless he was
paid a portion of the painter's weekly wages), aff'd, 99 N.E. 1116 (N.Y. 1912); People v.
Weinseimer, 102 N.Y.S. 579, 580 (App. Div.) (upholding the extortion conviction of the presi-
dent of a plumber's union for refusing commencement of contract work unless he was paid a
sum of money by the contractor), aff'd, 83 N.E. 1129 (N.Y. 1907); People v. Hughes, 32 N.E.
1105 (N.Y. 1893) (affirming the guilty verdict of extortion for a labor leader who threatened to
compel retailers to cease making purchases from a manufacturer unless the manufacturer paid
him a sum of money).
108. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 6.
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absent coercion by the official," 0 the historical practice of soliciting official
campaign contributions became suspect. The federal circuit courts split over
the most appropriate means to address this issue.
C. Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right.
The Quid Pro Quo Dilemma
Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right applies where the vic-
tim's motivation to pay the recipient stems from the victim's perception of
the recipient's power of public office."' Whether the public official has "ac-
tual" power to carry out a threat or favor is irrelevant as long as the victim
reasonably believes that such authority exists." 2 A number of federal appel-
late courts have concluded, however, that a literal application of this rule
would bring all political contributions within the scope of the Hobbs Act."
3
Consequently, these circuit courts require proof that the public official re-
ceived money "in exchange for specific promises to do or refrain from doing
specific things."'" 4 Accordingly, a majority of circuit courts have held that
the government must demonstrate the existence of a quid pro quo" 5 in order
to convict an elected public official of extortion under color of official right
for solicitation or acceptance of campaign contributions.
Private contributions have played a vital role in political campaigns for
public office throughout the history of the United States." 6 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized the important function of financial
contributions in expressing support for candidates and political view-
points.17 Furthermore, restricting political contributions could adversely
impact the free and open exchange of ideas in the political arena, particu-
110. See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972). See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1014 (1975); United States v. Salvitti, 464 F. Supp. 611, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
112. See United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 135-36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1020 (1985); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1010 (1986); United States v. Sorrow, 732 F.2d 176, 180 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. See infra notes 119-40 and accompanying text.
114. Bibby, 752 F.2d at 1127 n.l.
115. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for definitions of "quid pro quo."
116. See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN Fi-
NANCES: HISTORY, FACTS, AND CONTROVERSY (1992); GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE
MONEY TREE? AMERICAN CAMPAIGN FINANCING PRACTICES FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT
(1973).
117. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981)
(striking down a city ordinance which limited political expenditures because it operated as a
restraint on freedom of expression and association); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1976)




larly if the limitations prevent candidates and political groups from acquir-
ing the funds necessary to engage in broad public dialogue. 1 ' These
concerns prompted the majority of federal circuit courts to adopt a quid pro
quo requirement in order to prove official right extortion involving the solici-
tation or acceptance of campaign contributions by public officials.
1. Majority View: A Quid Pro Quo Requirement
A majority of federal circuits require the government to show a quid pro
quo by the official in order to convict him for extortion under color of official
right for the illegal receipt or solicitation of campaign contributions. The
Fifth Circuit first adopted a quid pro quo requirement in United States v.
Dozier."l9 The court held that the adoption of a quid pro quo requirement
for Hobbs Act prosecutions of elected officials would not discourage legiti-
mate requests for public contributions.12 °
Dozier was elected Commissioner of Agriculture for the state of Louisiana
in December 1975.121 A federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment
against Dozier in January 1980, identifying eleven separate transactions al-
legedly in violation of the Hobbs Act.122 Dozier was subsequently convicted
on four of the five counts, and sentenced to serve two consecutive five-year
terms of imprisonment. 
123
On appeal, Dozier maintained that his solicitations arose from the ordi-
nary fundraising activities of a public official faced with the financial burdens
of an impending election process. 124 The United States Court of Appeals for
118. The Supreme Court has expressed grave concern over the potential effect which con-
tribution limitations could have on public discourse, particularly in the context of political
campaigns. For example, the Court in Buckley wrote that "contribution restrictions could
have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political
committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 21.
119. 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
120. Id. The court stated that "we remain unpersuaded that the Hobbs Act, as previously
interpreted by this and other courts, discourages legitimate requests for political contribu-
tions." Id.
121. Id. at 535. Dozier's bid for reelection in December 1979 was unsuccessful, due pri-
marily to significant publicity surrounding the federal investigation of his activities as commis-
sioner. Id.
122. Id. Numerous solicitations of individuals and institutions with interests related to the
Agriculture Commission provided the basis for the alleged Hobbs Act violations. Id.
123. Id. at 536. In addition to imprisonment, Dozier received fines totalling $25,000 and
five years of probation. Id.
124. Id. Dozier particularly attacked the language used by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Williams, which affirmed a jury's conviction of an official because he
"accepted the money and gratuities, knowing he was not entitled to them in the discharge of
his lawful duties, and that payment was induced by his official position." United States v.
Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). The Court
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the Fifth Circuit rejected Dozier's arguments, stating that it would rely on
its own discretion to distinguish between a legitimate solicitation of political
support and an extortionate demand under the veil of official power. 1
25
Although the appellate court recognized that a fine line often separates legit-
imate political solicitation from the sale of official favors, the court stressed
the importance of discovering and penalizing extortionate activities under
the guise of requesting political donations.126 The Fifth Circuit concluded
that Dozier's solicitation of political funds violated the Hobbs Act because
he made the performance, or non-performance, of his official duties contin-
gent upon the payment of money. 127 The Fifth Circuit accordingly affirmed
Dozier's conviction for extortion.
128
In 1985, the Sixth Circuit followed the example of the Fifth Circuit by
adopting a quid pro quo requirement for the prosecution of Hobbs Act ex-
tortion under color of official right involving campaign contributions. The
appellate court in United States v. Bibby 129 affirmed the conviction of a for-
mer Tennessee state senator and two former business executives for extor-
tion arising out of a scheme to defraud the government.130  The senator
continuously held himself out as both knowledgeable on the issue of public
bids and connected with the people who award state contracts. 31' The busi-
ness executives arranged for payments to be made to the state senator in
exchange for assurances that certain state computer contracts would be
awarded to a particular company. 132 The appellate court recognized that
the senator's office itself provided the motivation for the payments, but since
the money was transferred under the auspice of campaign support, the gov-
ernment was required to show a quid pro quo by the senator to convict of
extortion under color of official right.'1
3
refuted Dozier's argument, however, by pointing out that Williams did not address the prob-
lem of political fundraising. See Dozier, 672 F.2d at 536 n. 1.
125. Dozier, 672 F.2d at 537. The court subsequently explained the essence of the "prohib-
ited exchange": "Whether described familiarly as a payoff or with the Latinate precision of
quid pro quo.... a public official may not demand payment as inducement for the promise to
perform (or not to perform) an official act." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 540. The Court proffered that "[a]t the very least, elected officials are, and have
been, on notice that any public officer, elected or otherwise, who makes performance (or non-
performance) of an official act contingent upon payment of a fee . . .is guilty of extortion
'under color of official right.' " Id.
128. Id. at 536.
129. 752 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986).
130. Id. at 1119.
131. Id. The senator also introduced the executives to other influential people in the state
legislature, which ultimately led to additional contracts with state agencies. Id.
132. Id. at 1119-20.
133. The court noted that "the Hobbs Act proscribes ... the taking of money by a public
official in exchange for specific promises to do or refrain from doing specific things. In other
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The Eleventh Circuit also adopted a quid pro quo requirement in order to
prove extortion under the Hobbs Act by a public official for solicitation or
acceptance of campaign contributions. In United States v. Haimowitz,' 34 a
jury convicted the defendants for attempted extortion under color of official
right, 135 which arose out of a scheme to obtain a liquor license for Peter
Abbott from the state of Florida.' 36 The court of appeals reversed the ver-
dict on the extortion counts, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to
show that the state senator's demand for money was coupled with a promise
by the senator to perform an act of official grace.' 37 At trial, the evidence
indicated that the defendants knew that Mr. Abbott was not qualified for the
license.' 3 ' The state based its charge of attempted extortion on Haimowitz'
suggestion to Abbott that $1000 be given to Scarborough as a campaign con-
tribution. 139 The court of appeals reversed the attempted extortion convic-
tion since there was no proof that Scarborough's demand for a contribution
was coupled with a promise to execute some favorable act in his official ca-
pacity. In short, there was no quid pro quo.
Despite the appearance of questionable behavior with respect to the ex-
change of money for political favors, the majority of jurisdictions require
that a quid pro quo be shown to convict a public official of extorting cam-
words, there must be a quid pro quo." Id. at 1127 n. I (citations omitted). The court also
upheld the guilty verdicts of the two business executives, despite their lack of actual influence
in the awarding of state contracts. Their apparent access to influential legislators established
"[r]easonable prospects" that the scheme would be successful. Id. at 1128.
134. 725 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
135. Id. at 1564-65. The relevant charges with respect to the Hobbs Act included Count
Three, which charged that Haimowitz obstructed and attempted to obstruct interstate com-
merce by extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Count Five, which charged Haimo-
witz and Scarborough with obstruction and attempted obstruction of interstate commerce in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Id.
136. Id. at 1565. Harold Haimowitz was Peter Abbott's personal attorney. The other de-
fendant convicted on the attempted extortion count was Dan Scarborough, former state sena-
tor and President Pro Tempore of the Florida Senate. Id.
137. Id. at 1573.
138. Id. Abbott admitted to previously defrauding from six to twelve banking institutions
of between $300,000 and $750,000. Id. In addition, he had six larceny convictions, and admit-
ted his participation in two Small Business Administration loan frauds, two arsons, narcotic
sales, and numerous other bad acts. Id. Furthermore, in January 1981, Abbott pled guilty to
interstate wire fraud. Id.
139. Id. at 1573 n.12. The issue was originally presented by Scarborough during a private
meeting. At trial, the evidence consisted of the following taped conversation:
Scarborough: I'm running for re-election by the way.
Haimowitz: Wait a minute, we'll get into that later.
Scarborough: No, no, no, I'll get into this now. I need a thousand dollars from you
when I run, in the form of a company check.
Abbott: No problem. I, you got it....
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paign contributions."' The standard in a minority of federal jurisdictions,
however, is more lenient.
2. Minority View: No Quid Pro Quo Requirement
In a minority of circuits, the conviction of public officials for extortion
under color of official right may be obtained without proof of a quid pro quo,
even when campaign contributions are involved. For example, in United
States v. Trotta,"4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reinstated a public official's indictment for extortion in the absence of an
explicit promise amounting to misuse of office.142 The court held that
although a quid pro quo may be forthcoming in a Hobbs Act extortion case,
it is not an essential element of the crime.'
43
Gerard Trotta, Commissioner of Public Works for the Town of Oyster
Bay, Long Island, was indicted for allegedly demanding payments of polit-
ical contributions to the local Republican Committee from the engineering
firm Cosulich Associates." Trotta, in his official capacity, executed public
contracts with engineering firms on behalf of the Town of Oyster Bay and
subsequently supervised the firms' performance. 14 Yet, neither agreements
to provide official favors nor threats to impose official injury on the engineer-
ing firm accompanied Trotta's demands for political support.'46 The district
court granted Trotta's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
it failed to allege with sufficient specificity all of the necessary facts compris-
ing the offense charged, namely extortion under color of official right.
147
The court of appeals, however, indicated that a quid pro quo "is not an
essential element of the crime."' 4 Rather, the payment need only be moti-
vated by the recipient's office, and the public official's acceptance of the pay-
ment must only be coupled with foreknowledge of its purpose to convict an
official of extortion under color of official right.
49
140. Id. at 1573. Other cases upholding Hobbs Act convictions of elected officials which
involve quid pro quo exchanges include United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 425-26 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 646 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
141. 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
142. Id. at 1101. The Court indicated "that the indictment is sufficient on its face." Id.
143. Id. at 1100. The Court of Appeals stated that "a quid pro quo may, of course, be
forthcoming in an extortion case, or it may not. In either event it is not an essential element of
the crime." Id.
144. Id. at 1097-98.
145. Id. at 1098.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1100.
149. Id. (referring to United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975)).
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The Fourth Circuit, initially addressing the question in United States v.
Barber,'5° aligned itself with the Second Circuit on the quid pro quo issue.
The court in Barber upheld the defendant's conviction for extortion despite
the absence of any explicit quid pro quo by the official. Barber, the former
commissioner of the West Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission
(ABCC), used his position to obtain free liquor for himself and other high
officials of the state.15' He was convicted of extortion under color of official
right. 1
52
The government argued during trial that the liquor companies' fears of
retaliation by the defendant public official induced the companies, which
were within the official's regulatory control, to continue providing the offi-
cial with services which would have otherwise ceased.' 53 On appeal, Barber
denied that he solicited the liquor companies for funds, and instead argued
that the bottles of liquor he received from the companies constituted gifts to
various state officials, including himself.
154
The Fourth Circuit spurned Barber's arguments, noting that the distribu-
tion of large quantities of free liquor ran "altogether contrary to custom.",
55
Rather than characterize the liquor that Barber had received as a gift, the
court of appeals interpreted the liquor companies' actions as the natural re-
sponse to Barber's implicit demand for payment with bottles of liquor in
exchange for his withholding of punitive measures.' 56 The court recognized
that if it read the Hobbs Act too broadly, it could effectively prohibit elected
officials from personally soliciting campaign contributions. 57 Nonetheless,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed Barber's extortion convictions,' concluding
that legitimate consideration of political solicitations did not "apply to si-
150. 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982).
151. Id. at 780-81. ABCC legally monopolized alcoholic beverage sales in West Virginia.
Under state law, representatives of the liquor companies could withdraw bottles from the
state's warehouse for business promotional purposes, after which the state would bill the liquor
company for the reimbursement cost of the bottles. In the defendant's case, each time he
withdrew liquor from the state warehouse, he would bill a liquor company for the cost of the
bottles, and process the authorization papers after-the-fact. Id. at 781.
152. Id. at 784.
153. Id. at 783-84. The Court noted that "[t]he giving of free liquor in substantial quanti-
ties is altogether contrary to custom, unless there is a reason, i.e., an expectation of a quid pro
quo." Id.
154. Id. at 784.
155. Id.
156. Id. The majority noted that "[w]hen the 'donee' is the state's alcoholic beverage chief,
the conclusion is irresistible that absent a convincing explanation, the 'gift' was not a gift, but,
rather, was in return for favors or for the withholding of punitive measures." Id.
157. Id. at 783. The court stated that "if read literally the Hedman language [describing
the Hobbs Act] could arguably prohibit a public official from personally soliciting a campaign
contribution." Id.
158. Id. at 784.
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phoning off alcoholic beverages and affording free access to them by the
Commissioner." 
5 9
II. MCCORMICK V UNITED STATES
The Fourth Circuit revisited the quid pro quo issue in United States v.
McCormick." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
articulated a standard by which legitimate campaign contributions could be
distinguished from monies extorted by the misuse of political office. 6 ' Ap-
plying a seven-point test,' 62 the court concluded that the monies received by
McCormick were never intended as campaign contributions. 163  In dicta,
however, the majority rejected the blanket requirement of a quid pro quo in
order to convict a public official of extortion under the Hobbs Act for the
receipt of campaign contributions.'"
In McCormick v. United States, 65 the Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals on the quid pro quo issue. Emphasizing the historical and practi-
cal role that political contributions have played in American electoral poli-
tics, 66 the Supreme Court refused to limit the right of a public official to
solicit and accept campaign contributions by bringing such activity within
the scope of the Hobbs Act.'67 Instead, the majority attached to the Hobbs
159. Id. at 783 n.2. The court stated that "asking for a campaign contribution does not
typically involve falsification of documents such as took place here. The very fact of such
shenanigans bears on the extreme unlikelihood that the liquor companies regarded what they
were doing as voluntary rather than compelled." Id.
160. 896 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991).
161. McCormick, 896 F.2d at 65.
162. Id. The appellate court formulated a seven-point test to determine whether the
money constituted a "legitimate" campaign contribution. The seven factors included:
(1) whether the money was recorded by the payor as a campaign contribution, (2)
whether the money was recorded and reported by the official as a campaign contribu-
tion, (3) whether the payment was in cash, (4) whether it was delivered to the official
personally or to his campaign, (5) whether the official acted in his official capacity at
or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor or supported legislation
that would benefit the payor, (6) whether the official had supported similar legislation
before the time of the payment, and (7) whether the official had directly or indirectly
solicited the payor individually for the payment.
Id. at 66.
163. Id. at 66-67. The court of appeals judged that "the evidence supports the conclusion
that the money was never intended by any of the parties to be a campaign contribution." Id. at
67.
164. Id. at 66. The Court noted its "agree[ment] with the Second Circuit['s holding in
Trotta] that alleged 'political contributions' may violate the Hobbs Act in more than one way."
Id.
165. 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991).
166. Id. at 1816-17.
167. Id. at 1815-17. The majority expressed concern that:
[t]o hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been
thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is una-
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Act a quid pro quo evidentiary standard to be applied in the narrow context
of prosecutions of elected public officials accused of extorting campaign
funds.16 Thus, an elected public official extorts campaign contributions in
violation of the Hobbs Act only when the official asserts explicitly that the
terms of his promise will control his official conduct.
169
The test for "legitimacy" enunciated by the appellate court posed the prin-
cipal concern for the Supreme Court.170 Noting that candidates for public
office must finance their campaigns through private contributions and ex-
penditures, the majority characterized the appellate court's test as over-
broad. 7' The Court reasoned that a political candidate's legitimate solic-
itation of funds might result in a conclusion of illegitimacy under all seven
factors of the test, despite the fact that such solicitations have long been
considered conduct which is both lawful and necessary for the pursuit of
public office in our political system.'72
The majority also expressed concern over the breadth of the trial court's
jury instructions. 7 ' The jury could have construed the instructions to mean
that a contribution was voluntary only if the donor had made the contribu-
voidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions or ex-
penditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation.
Id. at 1816.
168. Id. at 1814. The Court stated that "with respect to ... payments made to nonelected
officials or to payments made to elected officials that are properly determined not to be cam-
paign contributions[,] ... we do not consider how the 'under color of official right' phrase is to
be interpreted and applied." Id. See also id. at 1817 n.10. The Court explicitly declined to
"decide whether a quid pro quo requirement exists in other contexts, such as when an elected
official receives gifts, meals, travel expenses, or other items of value." Id.
169. Id. at 1816.
170. Id. at 1814-15. The Court explained: "[W]e cannot accept the Court of Appeals'
approach to distinguishing between legal and illegal campaign contributions." Id. at 1815.
171. Id. at 1815-16. The Court noted that the Department of Justice Manual also recog-
nized the danger of Hobbs Act overreaching: "[C]ampaign contributions will not be author-
ized as the subject of a Hobbs Act prosecution unless they can be proven to have been given in
return for the performance of or abstaining from an official act; otherwise any campaign con-
tribution might constitute a violation." Id. at 1817 (quoting 9 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (P-H) § 9-85A.306, at 9-1938.134 (Supp. 1988-2)).
172. Id. at 1816.
173. Id. at 1817. The Court observed that:
The instructions given here are not a model of clarity .... [U]nder the instructions a
contribution was not "voluntary" if given with any expectation of benefit; and as we
read the instructions, taken as a whole, the jury was told that it could find McCor-
mick guilty of extortion if any of the payments, even though a campaign contribu-
tion, was made by the doctors with the expectation that McCormick's official action
would be influenced for their benefit and if McCormick knew that the payment was
made with that expectation. It may be that the jury found that none of the payments
was a campaign contribution, but it is mere speculation that the jury convicted on
this basis rather than on the impermissible basis that even though the first payment
was such a contribution, McCormick's receipt of it was a violation of the Hobbs Act.
Id.
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tion with no expectation of benefit.174 The Court recognized that most if not
all campaign contributions are given with a general expectation of benefit. 175
The Court believed that the trial court's instructions, especially when viewed
in light of the appellate court's "legitimacy" test, effectively brought all
political contributions within the scope of the Hobbs Act. 176 To protect
against the prohibition of legitimate fundraising activities, the majority ruled
that a specific quid pro quo, rather than a general expectation of benefit, was
necessary to prove a Hobbs Act violation when the defendant claimed that
the money was a campaign contribution.
177
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, examined the statutory text of the
Hobbs Act with greater scrutiny. 17 Noting that the Hobbs Act "contains
not even a colorable allusion to campaign contributions or quid pro
quos[,]' 179 Justice Scalia hesitantly adopted the majority's conclusion.' °
Placing particular emphasis on the appropriate context for application of the
quid pro quo standard, Justice Scalia argued that the requirement merely
established the evidentiary threshold necessary to prove that an elected offi-
cial committed extortion under color of official right in violation of the
Hobbs Act for accepting or soliciting campaign contributions in return for
an explicit promise to perform or not to perform official acts.' Only in this
174. Id. at 1817-18. The majority noted: "The jury might well have found that the pay-
ments were campaign contributions but not voluntary because they were given with an expec-
tation of benefit." Id. at 1817.
175. Id. at 1816. The Court explained:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the district and indi-
viduals and groups therein is the everyday business of a legislator. It is also true that
campaigns must be run and financed. Money is constantly being solicited on behalf
of candidates, who run on platforms and who claim support on the basis of their
views and what they intend to do or have done.
Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Justice White indicated that:
The receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable under the Act as having been
taken under color of official right, but only if the payments are made in return for an
explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official
act. In such situations the official asserts that his official conduct will be controlled
by the terms of the promise or undertaking.
Id.
178. Id. at 1818-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 1818.
180. Id. Justice Scalia explained his concern: "I find it unusual and unsettling.., to make
[the] ... distinction [between legitimate campaign contributions and illegal payments in return
for specific favors] without any hint of a justification in the statutory text." Id.
181. Id. Justice Scalia observed that:
If the prohibition of the Hobbs Act ...against receipt of money 'under color of
official right' includes receipt of money from a private source for the performance of
official duties, that ambiguously described crime assuredly need not, and ... should
not, be interpreted to cover campaign contributions with anticipation of favorable
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limited context would Justice Scalia employ the quid pro quo standard for
the same reasons that Justice White enumerated in the majority opinion.'8 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia entertained an alternative inter-
pretation for the phrase "under color of official right" which would render
the Court's distinction between elected and nonelected officials obsolete.' 83
If the Court translated the word "right" in the phrase "color of official
right" to mean "entitlement," then both elected and nonelected officials
would be bound by the same rule.is4 Extortion under color of official right,
by this definition, would require some false assertion of official entitlement to
the property.' 85 Since neither party in McCormick briefed nor argued this
issue, Justice Scalia withheld adoption of this interpretation in order to care-
fully consider its historical accuracy in the framework of a future case.'
86
The dissenting opinion focused on two issues: Rule 30 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 30), and the evidentiary standard which
governs Hobbs Act prosecutions. 87 Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent-
ing opinion, opposed the Court's reversal of McCormick's conviction, as
well as the Court's treatment of the trial judge's jury instructions.' 88 Rule
30 requires that the petitioning party on appeal must have preserved, at trial,
a specific objection to the instructions in question as a condition precedent to
appellate consideration of the issue.' 8 9 The trial record showed that McCor-
mick failed to seek an instruction specifying that proof of an explicit quid
pro quo was necessary to convict an elected official under the Hobbs Act for
future action, as opposed to campaign contributions in exchange for an explicit
promise of favorable future action.
Id. (citation omitted).
182. Id.; see also supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text, for Justice White's rationale
in the majority opinion.
183. McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1818. Justice Scalia noted that "there is another interpreta-
tion of § 1951, contrary to the one that has been the assumption of argument here, that would
render the distinction unnecessary." Id.
184. Id. at 1819. This interpretation would limit the application of Hobbs Act prosecu-
tions for extortion under color of official right to officials, whether elected or appointed, who
falsely claim entitlement as a result of their office to the property or money in question. Id.
Thus, the question of protecting legitimate political solicitation of campaign funds would be
rendered moot.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1820. See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1894-1904 (1992)(Thomas,
J., dissenting) (urging adoption of the "color of official right" interpretation proposed by Jus-
tice Scalia in McCormick).
187. McCormick 111 S. Ct. at 1820-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1820-21, 1825.
189. Id. at 1820. Rule 30 provides, in relevant part: "No party may assign as error any
portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the
grounds of the objection." FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
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extorting a campaign contribution. 190 Thus, the dissent argued that McCor-
mick's conviction should have been affirmed.' 9' In addition, the dissent
challenged the majority's premise that absent a strict evidentiary quid pro
quo requirement, the Hobbs Act would subsume legitimate campaign contri-
butions as extortionate payments.' 92 The dissent argued that circumstantial
evidence should suffice to support a jury's determination that the money
served as an illegitimate payment for official acts rather than as a contribu-
tion for general support.19 3 Otherwise, absent clear proof as to the conduct
which a contributor expects the legislator to take, the mere demand for, and
payment of, campaign contributions would not constitute extortion.
III. POLITICAL SOLICITATION VERSUS CRIMINAL EXTORTION:
STRIKING THE BALANCE
The quid pro quo requirement adopted in McCormick is valuable because
it preserves the legitimacy of political fundraising.194 Absent such a require-
ment, the process of financing private political campaigns, a tradition in this
country since its inception, would become chaotic. On the other hand, im-
position of a strict evidentiary standard in the prosecution of public officials
for Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right in all contexts would
seriously curtail the effectiveness of the Hobbs Act as a tool for fighting
public corruption. 9 5 Thus, a balance should be struck which respects legiti-
mate political fundraising activity without destroying the elfectiveness of
Hobbs Act prosecutions.
A. Intent: The Controlling Issue
The overriding policy concern behind the quid pro quo requirement is
protecting conduct that is lawful and necessary for the execution of political
campaigns financed by private funding sources.' 9 6 A quid pro quo require-
190. McCormick, Ill S. Ct. at 1815 n.9. The majority recognized that McCormick sought
no such instruction at trial, and that McCormick's counsel even stated at one point that no
such requirement existed. Id. Nonetheless, the court of appeals entertained complete argu-
ments on the issue and presented a ruling. Id. The issue was fully briefed and argued before
the Supreme Court, as well. Id. The Court, therefore, concluded that the issue was "fairly
subsumed in the questions presented here." Id.
191. Id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1820-21.
193. Id. at 1821 (stating that "[s]ubtle extortion is just as wrongful-and probably much
more common-than the kind of express understanding that the Court's opinion seems to
require").
194. See supra notes 175, 177, 181; see also infra note 196.
195. See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
196. The Court explained in McCormick that:
Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that legisla-
tors commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constitu-
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ment, however, presents a potential obstacle to the broad application of the
Hobbs Act which federal prosecutors have enjoyed since Kenny. 197 The
higher evidentiary standard risks manipulation by a shrewd political opera-
tive who explicitly and publicly characterizes his illegal solicitation of money
as a campaign contribution. Despite the payor's knowledge that perform-
ance or non-performance of the official's duties is contingent upon payment
of the money, the public official would be shielded from a Hobbs Act indict-
ment absent an explicit quid pro quo. 198
The risk of manipulation by a calculating politician, however, is tempered
by the Court's emphasis on the issue of "intent" as a primary factor in a
jury's determination of whether particular funds should be treated as a cam-
paign contribution. 199 "Intent" is a question for the trier of fact,2" which
includes the issue of whether the candidate and payor intended certain mon-
ies to be campaign contributions.2°" Thus, before a trial judge decides that a
quid pro quo instruction is required by McCormick, the jury must first deter-
mine whether the money in question was intended by the parties as a cam-
paign contribution.2 "2 That the candidate explicitly misrepresents the
purpose of the funds will not alleviate the jury's burden to make an in-
dependent determination of the payment's true purpose.20 3 If the jury deter-
mines that the payor and candidate never intended the money as a general
campaign contribution, then the quid pro quo requirement is not triggered
by McCormick to prove extortion under color of official right. 2" In this
ents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents,
shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those
beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant when
making it a crime to obtain property from another, with his consent, 'under color of
official right.' To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that
has long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real
sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contribu-
tions or expenditures, as they have been since the beginning of the Nation.
Id. at 1816.
197. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 177, 193 and accompanying text.
199. McCormick 111 S. Ct. at 1815-17.
200. Id. at 1815 (referring to Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (asserting that
matters of intent are questions for the trier of fact)).
201. Id. The Court indicated that "in a case like this it is proper to inquire whether pay-
ments made to an elected official are in fact campaign contributions, and ... that the intention
of the parties is a relevant consideration in pursuing this inquiry." Id.
202. Id. (noting the Supreme Court's agreement with the court of appeals on the issue of
intent).
203. Id. at 1815-16. The Court noted that "[i]t goes without saying that matters of intent
are for the jury to consider." Id. at 1815.
204. McCormick did not explicitly decide whether a quid pro quo requirement exists in
contexts other than campaign contributions, "such as when an elected official receives gifts,
meals, travel expenses, or other items of value." Id. at 1817 n.10.
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instance, the primary concern of the quid pro quo requirement, which is the
protection of legitimate political fundraising activity, is not implicated.
205
In general, the judicial cost of a strict evidentiary standard such as the
quid pro quo requirement is the acceptance of some activity which, under a
more lenient evidentiary standard, would provide a sufficient basis for con-
viction. 0 6 In the case of Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right
for the solicitation of campaign funds, the importance of amassing monies
for broad-based political campaigns outweighs the burden on society caused
by the few cases in which the government will be unable to show a quid pro
quo. 20 ' A more lenient approach would infuse a high degree of uncertainty
into the requisite political exercise of soliciting campaign funds."08 If the
Court had adopted a more ambiguous standard of proof in McCormick, lo-
cal and state candidates for elective office might have responded by hiring
surrogates to solicit private donations in order to ensure compliance with the
Hobbs Act. The legality of such solicitations would be difficult to police,
since the candidates would not directly express the terms of any illegal con-
ditions linked to the receipt of campaign funds. Thus, the universal employ-





B. Elected Officials: Narrow Application of the Quid Pro Quo Standard
The quid pro quo requirement should be applied only in the very narrow
context of elected officials accused of extorting campaign funds through mis-
use of their official duties. Non-elected public officials do not need to solicit
political funds because they are not required to seek reelection in order to
maintain their public office. Since the primary purpose of the quid pro quo
requirement is to protect legitimate solicitation of campaign funds, ap-
205. Id. at 1816.
206. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (defending the
strict evidentiary standard in criminal trials by noting that the "social disutility of convicting
an innocent man . . . [is greater than] the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty");
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (stating that due process requires a strict
evidentiary standard in criminal trials because the defendant has a significant interest in main-
taining his liberty and freedom).
207. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 167, 175, 181 and accompanying text; see also supra note 193 and
accompanying text for a description of the vague approach encouraged by Justice Stevens'
dissent in McCormick.
209. But see Letter from David Eisenberg, former Assistant United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York and for the District of Columbia, to Scott B. Gilly, Editor-in-
Chief, Catholic University Law Review (Jan. 26, 1993) (on file with the Catholic University Law
Review) (arguing that the hiring of surrogates by candidates for public office to solicit private
donations will merely inject the concept of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988), or aiding and
abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), into the prosecution).
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pointed public officials should not be entitled to receive a quid pro quo jury
instruction. A non-elected public official who accepts a gift of value ought to
be convicted for extortion under color of official right if it can be shown at
trial that the money or property was received by the official with the knowl-
edge that it was given for the purpose of influencing his official actions.21°
Therefore, an explicit quid pro quo should not be required, but only circum-
stantial evidence indicating the official's awareness of the purpose for the
gift.
C. False Pretense Rule: Unnecessarily Narrow
A public official's misuse of office for personal financial gain falls within
the contemporary scope of extortion under color of official right.21 ' If the
Supreme Court were to limit application of the Hobbs Act, as Justice Scalia
proposed, to those cases where an official wrongfully asserts his entitlement
to the money for performance of official acts,2 12 then any official could es-
cape prosecution under the Hobbs Act by merely acknowledging the absence
of his entitlement to the money.21 3 Limiting the application of the Hobbs
Act to such "false pretense" scenarios would seriously curtail its value as a
weapon against public corruption. 214 Hobbs Act prosecutions for extortion
under color of official right should include false pretense scenarios, as well as
a public official's demand for payment in return for the exercise of his official
duties.2 15 It is the latter situation which likely provides the most frequent
abuse of public office, and thus leads to the most frequent application of the
Hobbs Act extortion statute. As a result, the Hobbs Act should not be lim-
210. See, e.g., United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
"[d]emands for money by an unelected official may constitute extortion per se; the latent power
of office ordinarily is sufficient to taint such demands as coercive").
211. See Ruff, supra note 5, at 1186-93.
212. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
213. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 895 (observing that a restriction on prosecutions for
extortion "under color of official right" to "false pretense" scenarios allows public officials to
avoid an extortion charge simply be admitting to the victim that the payoff was not really due).
214. See Brief for the United States at 20-21, McCormick v. United States, 896 F.2d 61
(No. 89-1918) (4th Cir. 1990). The United States recognized that:
The adoption of [the "false pretense" limitation] would lead to a radical narrowing of
the statute's reach. Under [this construction], a public official would commit the
crime of extortion under color of official right only if he claimed that a fee was re-
quired by law when in fact no such fee was due. Under this theory, a public official
would not commit extortion under color of official right when demanding a payoff in
exchange for performing his job, even if there was an explicit demand for payment or
a clear promise of a quid pro quo, unless he falsely represented that the payment was
legally required.
Id.
215. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 905-09.
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ited in its application to false pretense scenarios; otherwise, its value as a
federal anti-corruption statute would be significantly undermined.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hobbs Act provides the federal government with an effective means
of fighting public corruption on the state and local levels. Although the lan-
guage employed by the Hobbs Act to define extortion originated in the com-
mon law and evolved with the New York Penal Code, the need to protect
legitimate political fundraising activities posed no conflict under early extor-
tion statutes. Common law extortion doctrine did not contemplate political
campaigns funded by private expenditures.
Unlike common law extortion or extortion under early New York law, the
application of Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right in federal
prosecutions must take account and allow for legitimate political fundraising
activity. If the Act sweeps too broadly, conduct long considered lawful in a
political campaign would suddenly assume the illegal character of extortion
under color of official right. The United States Supreme Court reconciled
the need to protect such activity with the desirability of prosecuting crooked
officials in McCormick v. United States by requiring an explicit quid pro quo
to prove extortion involving campaign contributions. Because the policy in-
terests underlying the quid pro quo requirement do not extend to appointed
public officials, the mere knowledge by an appointed official that his position
is the motivation for the gift, brings the payment within the scope of the
Hobbs Act. This distinction preserves the future effectiveness of Hobbs Act
prosecutions for extortion under color of official right.
Eric David Weissman
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